

ICSNet: A Hybrid-Interaction Honeynet for Industrial Control Systems

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Carlos Rubio-Medrano² and Alvaro A. Cardenas¹,

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
CPSIoTSec 2024. October 18th, Salt Lake City, U.S.A

Cyber-Physical Systems




Industrial Control

Cyber-Physical Systems



Honeypots and Honeynets


Honeynets interact with attacker; thus, learning its goals, patterns, and techniques, and then provides data to better prepare defense strategies and countermeasures.




Honeynet

Honeypots and Honeynets

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


Honeynet




Challenges: ICS Nature

- Diversity of vendors




Challenges: ICS Nature

- Diversity of vendors
- Diversity of industrial protocols




Challenges: ICS Nature

- Diversity of vendors
- Diversity of industrial protocols
- Diverse physical processes



Challenges: ICS Nature

- Diversity of vendors
- Diversity of industrial protocols
- Diverse physical processes
- Different Functionalities (e.g. HMI)



Contribution

Supported ICS Devices	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	ICSNet
	1	1	1	2	NS	2	5	7	12

- [1] SCADA HoneyNet Project
- [2] Xiao et al, S7CommTrace
- [3] Wade, Scada Honeynets
- [4] Vestergaard, Conpot

- [5] Srinivasa et al, Interaction matters
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NS: Not Specified

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Interaction Level	L	H	H	L	Y	H	H	H	Y

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H: High Interaction; **L:** Low Interaction; **Y:** Hybrid interaction; **NS:** Not Specified

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Physical Process Simulation	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓

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Physical Process Simulation	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓
Modularity	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Honeynet	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓

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Modularity	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Honeynet	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Supported Manufacturers	1	1	1	2	NS	3	3	3	6

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Contribution



We designed ICSNet, an open-source ICS honeynet that has **advanced** features for device, protocol and physical process simulation.

<https://anonymous.4open.science/r/ics-virtual-testbed-766D>



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Personality Engine: Device List


We have access to 12 ICS devices from different vendors and diverse functionality.

Contribution: Devices

Siemens ET 200



Siemens ET 200s



Siemens S7-1200



Siemens S7-1500



Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1400



ABB PM554-TP-ETH



Allen-Bradley Micrologix 1100




Moxa EDS-405A Switch



N. I. cRIO-9024



Allen-Bradley ENBT



Siemens S7-300



N. I. cRIO-9068



Contribution



We designed ICSNet, an open-source ICS honeynet that has **advanced** features for device, protocol and physical process simulation.

Personality Engine: Fingerprints

There was no fingerprints for those devices in the open access Nmap database

We used Nmap to extract fingerprints of said devices and use it in our personality engine.

Contribution



We designed ICSNet, an open-source ICS honeynet that has **advanced** features for **device**, protocol and physical process simulation.

Personality Engine: Web scraping

The screenshot shows a web browser window displaying the Rockwell Automation interface. The browser address bar shows "Not secure | 192.168.0.10/index.html". The page header includes the Allen-Bradley logo and the device ID "1756-ENBT/A". The main content area displays a table of device information:

Device Name	1756-ENBT/A
Device Description	
Device Location	
Ethernet Address (MAC)	00:1D:9C:D3:BE:80
IP Address	192.168.110.60
Product Revision	6.006 Build 4
Firmware Version Date	May 2 2012, 11:19:45
Serial Number	00D65567
Status	Unconnected
Uptime	00h:14m:13s


Additional elements include a "Resources" link with the text "Visit AB.com for additional information" and a "Contacts" link. The footer contains the copyright notice: "Copyright © 2004 Rockwell Automation, Inc. All Rights Reserved."

Contribution



We designed ICSNet, an open-source ICS honeynet that has **advanced** features for device, **protocol** and physical process simulation.

We developed libraries; Protocol Modules, for representative ICS network protocols and deployed them in device handlers as Protocol Listeners.




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Representative Network Protocols in ICS



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Contribution




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
High Fidelity Physical Process Simulation

We used an external simulator or PLC trainer, named Factory I/O. We added an HMI via FUXA open-source software.


Architecture: Modularity




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
Architecture: Modularity



PLC Trainer

Threat Model


- The attacker already has a foothold in the network
- They will perform reconnaissance attacks.
- We assume they use popular tools like NMap



ICSNet Evaluation

Fingerprint, Protocol and Web Evaluation consist in comparing our honeynet-emulated devices versus real devices, to do so we used widely adopted open-source tools like Nmap or Nikto:


1. Fingerprint evaluation



ICSNet Evaluation

Fingerprint, **Protocol** and Web Evaluation consist in comparing our honeynet-emulated devices versus real devices, to do so we used widely adopted open-source tools like Nmap or Nikto:


2. Protocol evaluation



ICSNet Evaluation

Fingerprint, Protocol and **Web Evaluation** consist in comparing our honeynet-emulated devices versus real devices, to do so we used widely adopted open-source tools like Nmap or Nikto:

3. Web Evaluation



ICSNet Evaluation

Fingerprint, Protocol and Web Evaluation consist in comparing our honeynet-emulated devices versus real devices, to do so we used widely adopted open-source tools like Nmap or Nikto.

Additionally, we want to know if an attacker can interact with physical process parameters and furthermore exploit known protocol vulnerabilities (**Physical process evaluation**)

ICSNet Evaluation



1. Device Fingerprint Evaluation

We ran Nmap reconnaissance commands from a machine connected to ICSNet, and we compare those findings running the same commands on the real devices.

ICSNet Evaluation



1. Device Fingerprint Evaluation

Device	% OS detection Real	% OS detection ICSNet
Allen-Bradley enbt/a	100	40
Micrologix 1400	36	100
Mguard RS4004	100	100
MOXA EDS-405A	86	100
NI-Crio-9024	100	100
NI-Crio-9068	100	100
Siemens 200sp	10	80
Siemens S7-1500	100	100
Siemens S7-1200	100	100

ICSNet Evaluation



2. ICS Protocol Evaluation

We used specific protocol identification using Nmap on the ICSNet emulated devices.

```
nmap -p 2404 -v -v -v -v -n -Pn --script=iec-identify 10.0.0.10.
```

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
2404/tcp  open  iec-104 syn-ack ttl 128
| iec-identify:
|   ASDU address: 10
|_ Information objects: 5
```

ICSNet Evaluation



2. ICS Protocol Evaluation

ICS Protocol	Implementation	Evaluation tool	Result
Modbus	ICSNet custom	nmap script	✓
IEC-104	NEFICS	nmap script	✓
ENIP	cpppo	nmap script	✓
SNMP	snmpsim	nmap script	✓
HTTP	Python HTTPServer	Nikto	✓

ICSNet Evaluation



3. Web Evaluation

We ran Nikto on subset of devices that have a webpage service in both real devices and ICSNet simulated devices and compare the web server detection.

Nikto also provides a list of http header vulnerabilities and report of web server requests.

ICSNet Evaluation




3. Web Evaluation

Device	Requests		Server match	Vulnerable headers
	real	simulated		
Allen-Bradley enbt/a	1451	1288	yes	2/2
Micrologix 1400	1435	1376	yes	2/2
Siemens S7-1500	1383	1245	yes	3/3
MOXA switch	1426	1335	yes	1/1
mGuard RS4004	1512	1368	yes	2/2

ICSNet Evaluation




4. Physical Process Evaluation



ICSNet Evaluation




4. Physical Process Evaluation



ICSNet Evaluation



4. Physical Process Evaluation



Conclusions and Future Work



We present ICSNet, an industrial honeynet supporting the largest set of devices, protocols, and physical processes



Questions



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TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
CORPUS CHRISTI